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I. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Loper v. New York City Police Department,' if it remains law, will continue
the expansive tendency of twentieth century First Amendment jurisprudence
and scholarship. This tendency has been complicated recently by the
appearance of such issues as anti-abortion picketing2 and campus speech
codes, in which the traditional liberal enthusiasm for wider First Amendment
protection and conservative resistance to it are reversed Loper represents a
* Assistant Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Dowling College, Member of the New
York Bar and former Manhattan Assistant District Attorney. Daniel S. Komansky, Esq. and Mr.
David Mason contributed their coimments upon earlier drafts of this manuscript. The conclusions
herein are the author's own.
1. 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
2. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
3. This phenomenon is reflected in books challenging the viability and value of free speech.
See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SucH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT'S A GOOD THING
Too (1994); CASs R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); see also John 0.
McGinnis, The PartialRepublican, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1751 (1994) (reviewing CASs R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)).
1
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traditional free speech controversy in this sense. The Loper doctrine will also
figure in the increasingly intense debate over the state of our urban civiliza-
tion. It is the latter aspect of public policy that gives the court's opinion its
emotional impact. Although the case does not involve the violent crime and
narcotics trafficking that have so ravaged and terrorized American cities, it
does address one of their all too familiar aspects: the ubiquitous presence of
street beggars or panhandlers. This presence remains somehow disconcerting
to many law-abiding citizens, despite assurances from very distinguished
sources that what they perceive as a blight is in fact harmless and should
arouse compassion more than resentment. And when such assurances emanate
from those adorned in the black raiment of adjudication, which bespeaks the
stricture of law and the standard of civilized intercourse in a free society, the
matter engenders a certain alarm. The overwhelming impulse is to respond
on the issue of civic morality alone-to insist that a community, if it is to be
happy and productive, cannot ask its members to run a gauntlet of more or
less aggressive vagrants accosting them for money each time they leave their
homes. Nor can such a response be deemed unnecessary, in light of the
nostrums of social justice put forth with some passion by opponents of anti-
begging statutes.
4
The substantial body of scholarship now supporting a First Amendment
right to beg often reflects a particular thesis concerning poverty in America.
According to this thesis, ordinances against panhandling show callousness and
have the objective of punishing, silencing and concealing the homeless. It
seems that our society bears a heavy onus for the homeless population's very
existence. The denial of First Amendment protection turns out to be the final
blow. It relegates the homeless to the status of "constitutional castaways." 5
It was bad enough that in the 1980s we elected Republican presidents, who
were indifferent to the plight of society's most unfortunate persons,6 but to
4. See, e.g., Paul G. Chevigny, Begging and the First Amendment: Young v. New York City
Transit Authority, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 525 (1991); Irah H. Donner, Young v. New York City
Transit Authority: The First Amendment Protects Flag Burners, Nazis, Professional Solicitors,
and Commercial Advertisers: Did Our Framers Forget About the Poor?, 59 TRANSP. PRAC. J.
152 (1992); Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and
the Right to Beg, 104 HARVARD L. REv. 896 (1991); Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and
the First Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 255
(1994); Aaron Johnson, Note, The Second Circuit Refuses to Extend Beggars a Helping Hand:
Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 969 (1991); Stephanie M.
Kaufman, Comment, First Amendment Protection of Begging in Subways, 79 GEO. L.J. 1803
(1991); Charles F. Knapp, Comment, Statutory Restriction of Panhandling in Light of Young v.
New York City Transit: Are States Begging Out of FirstAmendment Proscriptions?, 76 IOWA L.
REV. 405 (1991); Anthony J. Rose, Note, The Beggar's Free Speech Claim, 65 IND. L.J. 191
(1989).
5. Millich, supra note 4, at 266-69.
6. Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 4, at 898.
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compound this mishap with laws preventing these people from begging on the
public streets and subways is truly inhumane. Such laws, it is said, not only
demonstrate a lack of empathy for the impoverished and an intolerance
towards them but also represent a kind of cover-up.7 The ordinances against
begging are intended to blot out the homeless, "to reduce their visibility."8
Beyond this, the proscription of panhandling constitutes a form of dis-
crimination. The speech of the poor (understood as coeval with the class of
derelicts who panhandle on streets and subways) alone is without protection.9
If it develops that citizens using the subways or public streets are unhappy
about beggars accosting them, that unhappiness constitutes an unfortunate bias
that the courts are bound to ignore.'" We are told that laws against panhan-
dling do violence to the high moral principles of compassion and egalitarian-
ism and that such laws indicate a malaise in the souls of those Americans who
are not panhandlers and who object to their presence.
The foregoing makes it natural that someone attempt to offer a slightly
different analysis of the anti-loitering statutes. Is their purpose really to
effectuate a hard-heartedness towards the destitute? Is it not possible that laws
against public begging are intended instead to preserve the modicum of public
civility necessary to any successfully functioning society?" To address these
questions thoroughly undoubtedly would be to overstep the bounds of this
inquiry. It would involve examining the characteristics of the homeless, or
more precisely, of the homeless who choose to beg.12 It might even require
determining whether all of those who beg really are homeless and destitute.
This, in turn, would mean scrutinizing the portrait of the panhandlers entwined
in the arguments of their legal, academic champions. 3 The portrait tends to
7. Millich, supra note 4, at 259-61.
8. Id. at 259.
9. See, e.g., Donner, supra note 4, at 153; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 1039-40 (1995) (suggesting that measures to limit
panhandling are intended to impose a kind of social orthodoxy).
10. Donner, supra note 4, at 161-62.
11. Cf. THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE ENNOBLING OF DEMOCRACY 158-59 (1993); Robert C.
Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows and
Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1173-78, 1181-84, 1246-48 (1996); Robert Teir,
Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public Spaces: A Constitutional Approach to Aggressive
Begging, 54 LA. L. REV. 285, 286-87, 294-95 (1993) (arguing that anti-begging ordinances are
a constitutionally legitimate means by which a community may establish and maintain appropriate
standards of public conduct); George Kelling, Is There a Right to Beg?, CITY J., Spring 1993,
at 18-19. While generally supporting measures to control "public misconduct," Professor
Ellickson's work also attempts to find economic "benefits" that may flow from begging.
Ellickson, supra, at 1179-81.
12. This task has been undertaken adroitly in CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, THE HOMELESS (1994)
and ALICE S. BAUM & DONALD W. BURNES, A NATION IN DENIAL: THE TRUTH ABOUT
HOMELESSNESS (1993). See also Heather MacDonald, San Francisco Gets Tough With the
Homeless, CITY J., Fall 1994, at 30, 34-35.
13. See, e.g., Millich, supra note 4, at 257-65 nn.1-21 (describing the homeless as formerly
19971
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be one of wholly functional, upstanding citizens forced into the streets by
adverse economic circumstances.1 4 We might wonder whether this view of
the panhandler applies to a few or to many persons.' 5 It perhaps is not the
typical impression of anyone using a city street or subway. That impression
often is one of drug addiction and alcoholism. It is sometimes one of
apparently able-bodied but wastrel young men and women with white cups.'
6
productive members of society who have been forced into the streets by economic forces beyond
their control).
14. Id. Similarly, a study cited in Anthony J. Rose's note on beggars' free speech attempts
to show that "[t]he stereotype of the grizzled street alcoholic does not conform to the reality of
homelessness today.'" Rose, supra note 4, at 199 n.47. The study assigns the following
percentages to the reasons people of Seattle in 1986 requested shelter: Unemployment: 29%;
Family Crisis/Eviction: 22 %; Alcoholism: 21%; Domestic Abuse: 15 %; Mental Illness: 13 %.
Id. Such statistics, as far as we can tell from this article, are based simply upon the reasons given
by those requesting shelter, without any objective verification. There is no indication as to what
the reason for the unemployment of the 29% so responding might have been. The implication
is that the cited unemployment rate was unrelated to any of the other specified causes of
homelessness (alcoholism, mental illness). Was drug abuse not a reason for anyone's
homelessness in Seattle in 1986? See also BAUM & BURNES, supra note 12, at 116-17
(discussing the role of the news media and homeless advocates in perpetuating the notion that
those in shelters or on the streets are just upstanding citizens afflicted with economic misfortune).
15. Cf. NEw YORK CITY COMMISSION ON THE HOMELESS, THE VAY HOME 6-30 (1992).
The Commission observed, "Significant numbers of those without homes are people with
physical, mental health and/or substance abuse problems." Id. at 9. Within the single homeless
shelter population, drug testing proved positive in 65% of the cases. Id. at 28. "[S]lightly more
than half (53%) of single shelter residents appearted] to have either a mental health or a self-
reported drug abuse problem." Id. at 26. While these problems were found to be decidedly less
commonplace among family shelter residents and the Commission certainly complained of
economic causes, it noted that "the goal of welfare should be to help the recipient attain economic
and social independence." Id. at 9. No one is likely to attain such independence by becoming
a beggar on the public streets. The Commission's assertions regarding the connection between
reduced federal funding and homelessness are assailed in JENCKS, supra note 12, at 98-99.
16. See, e.g., N.R. Kleinfeld, Police Reach Out to the Homeless, But Often Find Efforts
Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1994, at Al (relating the reluctance of the homeless to accept
offers from officers); Rita Kramer, The Undeserving Poor, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1995, at A20
(recounting the author's recent efforts at enticing panhandlers to accept three nights lodging, food,
clothing, counseling and further assistance instead of money); MacDonald, supra note 12, passim
(describing the efforts of the San Francisco authorities to deal realistically with the homeless
problem); David Seifman, City Homeless Vanish If Asked to Prove Need, N.Y. POST, July 28,
1994, at 11 (claiming that when the City of New York announced an eligibility screening of
families applying for emergency shelter, 360 of 1075 families selected for such examination failed
to appear); see also Heather MacDonald, Hope for the Homeless?, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1994,
at A25 (supporting New York Mayor Guilliani's program for the homeless); Heather MacDonald,
The Homeless Rights Counterrevolution, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1994, at A18 (discussing the
waning tide of sympathy for the homeless). But see Mary Brosnahan, The Mayor's Empty
Words, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1994, at A25 (criticizing the Guilliani administration for introducing
a program by which homeless families would be required to sign written plans for maintaining
households, and prospective single shelter residents plans for mental health and drug treatment).
[Vol. 48:267
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Of course, personal impressions vary and cannot by themselves form the
basis of public policy. If the subject here were really homelessness and its
remedy we might give more than perfunctory attention to the documentary
evidence supporting one or the other analysis. The present concern, however,
is the First Amendment. The reply to Loper and its academic defenders
cannot be merely that such a holding sanctifies a public nuisance. For even
if that were demonstrated to the satisfaction of an objective reader and even
if it were shown that the problems of homelessness and poverty were better
treated in ways other than protecting the street presence of beggars, the
believers in the alleged right might reply that we pay a price for our
constitutional liberties. They might suggest further that upholding the rights
of despised and downtrodden is always unpopular, and that in Loper, the court
braved the passions of a crime-ridden society in order to do its duty. It is
necessary to deal with Loper and like decisions first and foremost with
reference to the First Amendment issues that they present. Is panhandling
protected speech? It is necessary, above all, to resist the tendency to separate
the formalism of the law, the hermeneutics of stare decisis and statutory
construction, from the discussion of controversial opinions.17 This tendency,
like the politicization of judicial selection, implies the removal of whatever
distinction is left between the political and judicial processes. It renders all
constitutional debate a subterfuge, concealing a struggle over the extra-
democratic formulation of policy.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the doctrine espoused in
Loper, and the academic writings that support it, represent an utter and
lamentable distortion of First Amendmentjurisprudence. Moreover, they have
the effect of setting the Constitution at war with civic virtue and thereby with
the best aspirations of the American people. The authors and defenders of
Loper take the architectonic document of the American system, which must
command the devotion of our citizens, and proclaim that it forces them to
endure silently a mode of anti-social behavior each day of their lives.
H. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTORY CONTRIBUTION TO
THE ISSUE
We shall begin with the two Second Circuit decisions addressing the
question: Loper and Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 8 its
immediate predecessor. The Young opinion deals with panhandling in the
The Guilliani program produced an immediate protest from such homeless advocates as Ms.
Brosnahan.
17. Cf. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARv. J. L. & PUB.
POL. 583 (1993) (arguing for the compatibility of morality and legal formalism).
18. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
1997]
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subways. It denies First Amendment protection to subway beggars, but
leaves open the possibility that panhandling might enjoy such protection on the
public streets. 19
The court in Loper holds that street begging is protected speech because
it "usually involves some communication" akin to "a particularized social or
political message," namely "speech indicating the need for food, shelter,
clothing, medical care or transportation." 2' Furthermore, the beggar's
speech is no different from the solicitation of money for charities, which was
held to be protected speech in International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee.2 The judges in Loper see "little difference between those who
solicit for organized charities and those who solicit for themselves in regard
to the message conveyed. The former are communicating the needs of others
while the latter are communicating their personal needs."' Since "[b]oth
solicit the charity of others," the court concludes that "It]he distinction is not
a significant one for First Amendment purposes. "3
Having found that begging is protected speech, the Loper panel deter-
mines that the New York public loitering statute impermissibly fails to impose
the least obtrusive means of regulating its method and location. Specifically,
if beggars commit "socially undesirable conduct" in the course of begging, the
police can arrest them for other offenses such as harassment, disorderly
conduct, fraudulent accosting and menacing.' It is therefore "ludicrous" to
say that the ordinance against loitering for the purpose of begging is necessary
to prevent such abuses.' The ordinance leaves open no "alternative channels
of communication by which beggars can convey their messages of indigency"
and so is different from the regulation in Young, which only kept them out of
the subways. 5 The street is among the "'quintessential public forums'" in
which "'government may not prohibit all communicative activity.'"27
Finally, the court explains that the ordinance is not "content neutral because
it prohibits all speech related to begging."'
Now, we must presume that the Loper court did not interpret the Penal
Law section at issue as literally proscribing counsel for the plaintiff from
discussing his case on the public streets, or as preventing a would-be beggar
19. Id. at 161.
20. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993).
21. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
22. Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
23. d.
24. Id. at 701-02.
25. Id. at 701.
26. Id. at 705.
27. Id. at 703 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983)).
28. Id. at 705 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 48:267
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from remarking to his friend, or to anyone else, upon the law's injustice.
Instead, the court surely means that the Penal Law section would prohibit all
begging, or more precisely all "loitering for the purpose of begging."29
Whether this is really pertinent to content neutrality, as previously defined, is
another matter, to which we shall advert presently.
In making the above findings, the Loper panel claims to apply the
standard for evaluating speech exercised in connection with conduct. This is
the standard enunciated in the draft card-burning case, United States v.
O'Brien:30
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.3'
In Loper, the court devotes some attention to the Young opinion and its
application of O'Brien. The Young opinion essentially says that panhandlers
have alternative means of communicating their messages because "'begging
is prohibited only in the subway, not throughout all of New York City."' 32
The Loper court naturally emphasizes this one point. It provides the obvious
basis for distinguishing Young and making it appear consistent with the First
Amendment protection of street begging. To forbid panhandling in the
subways is one thing, but to keep it off the streets as well is oppressive.
The Young opinion actually proceeds from the following analysis, which
the court in Loper sees fit to ignore:
We initiate our discussion by expressing grave doubt as to whether
begging and panhandling in the subway are sufficiently imbued with a
communicative character to justify constitutional protection. The real
issue here is whether begging constitutes the kind of "expressive conduct"
protected to some extent by the First Amendment.
Common sense tells us that begging is much more "conduct" than it
is "speech." As then Circuit Judge Scalia once remarked: "That this
should seem a bold assertion is a commentary upon how far judicial and
scholarly discussion of this basic constitutional guarantee has strayed
from common and common-sense understanding." 
33
29. Id. at 701.
30. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
31. Id. at 377.
32. Loper, 999 F.2d at 702 (quoting Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146,
160 (2d Cir. 1990)).
33. Young, 903 F.2d at 153 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703
1997]
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In its elaboration of the "common and common-sense understanding"
that panhandling is not protected speech, the Young court makes reference to
the standard articulated in the flag-burning case, Texas v. Johnson,"4 and in
Spence v. Washington." These decisions state that the test for deciding
when conduct constitutes First Amendment protected speech is "whether
'[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it."' 36 Using this standard, the Young opinion expressly rejects the
notion that panhandling is protected speech: "[B]egging is not inseparably
intertwined with a 'particularized message.' It seems fair to say that most
individuals who beg are not doing so to convey any social or political
message. Rather they beg to collect money."37 Even though some individu-
al beggar may have a social message in mind, "there hardly seems to be a
'great likelihood' that the subway passengers who witness the conduct are
able to discern what the particularized message might be." '38 In rejecting the
notion that the "message" of panhandlers is understood by its recipients, the
court in Young, to some extent, does rely upon the circumstances of the New
York City subways: "In the subway, it is the conduct of begging and
panhandling, totally independent of any particularized message, that
passengers experience as threatening, harassing and intimidating."
' 3 9
Therefore, "[g]iven the passengers' apprehensive state of mind, it seems
rather unlikely that they would be disposed to focus attention on any
message, let alone a tacit and particularized one."40 The court, nonetheless,
makes clear that it views begging per se as fundamentally unrelated to
communicative speech.
The only message that we are able to espy as common to all acts of
begging is that beggars want to exact money from those whom they
accost. While we acknowledge that passengers generally understand this
F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'd, 486 U.S. 288 (1984)).
34. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
35. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
36. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11). The Court appears to
have abandoned the "particularized message" test in a more recent decision, Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995). The Court observes that
"a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which
if confined to expressions conveying a 'particularized message,' would never reach the
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Sch6nberg, or Jabberwocky
verse of Lewis Carroll." 115 S. Ct. at 2345 (citation omitted). Further decisions by the Court
presumably will clarify whether the unqualified reversal of this criterion is intended.
37. Young, 903 F.2d at 153.
38. Id. at 153-54.
39. Id. at 154. See Teir, supra note 11, at 313-14.
40. Young, 903 F.2d at 154.
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generic message, we think it falls far outside the scope of protected
speech under the First Amendment. We certainly do not consider it as a
"means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.41
The court notes that the New York regulation does not prohibit the
would-be beggars from speaking to subway passengers about poverty, social
conditions or anything else. Rather, it prohibits a direct solicitation of funds
from the passengers: "[T]he object of begging and panhandling is the
transfer of money. Speech simply is not inherent to the act; it is not of the
essence of the conduct." 42
The Second Circuit, therefore, has provided what are substantially
contradictory analyses of the question at hand. The Young and Loper holdings
could be reconciled, but only in their narrowest formulation. The facts of
Young involve only subway begging, rendering the broader rejection of
panhandling as protected speech obiter -dictum. And yet, the detailed
discussion in that opinion of the First Amendment status of panhandling and
of the grounds for rejecting it as protected speech cannot be ignored. It has
not been ignored. The Young court's underlying First Amendment interpreta-
tion is the object of the most severe academic criticism.
III. Is BEGGING PROTECTED SPEECH?
A. Objectives of the First Amendment
The essence of the Loper doctrine is that a beggar accosting passersby
on the street is conveying a "particularized social or political message," thus
commanding the protection of the First Amendment.4' The premise of this
determination is that the Amendment applies only to utterances characterized
as having such a message. This viewpoint is congruent with the arguments
known to the framers of the First Amendment and has been affirmed by the
most illustrious exponents of free speech in- subsequent generations. The
First Amendment is, after all, a legal codification of Enlightenment discourse
upon what Spinoza termed the "theological-political" problem and the related
matter of free speech.' The history of this episode in western political
41. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by
Holmes, J., concurring) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
42. Id.
43. Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
44. See Stanley Rosen, Benedict Spinoza, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 456,463-
75 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 1987); cf. WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1-2, 22-23 (Regenery Gateway 1985) (1976);
FRANCIS CANAVAN, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: PURPOSE As LIMIr 41-79, 143-52 (1984).
1997]
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philosophy and its relationship to the Constitution has received its account
and analysis elsewhere.4 ' For present purposes, we need only recall the
extent to which the freedom of speech tradition, before and after the
enactment of the Bill of Rights, emphasized the preservation of diverse
political opinion and learned discourse. The forging of enlightenment in an
intellectually active society by the perpetual contention of truth, partial truth,
and falsehood was ever the hope of free speech's most gifted exponents.46
In its most famous expostulation, the case against the licensure or prior
restraint of writings rested upon the contributions to society of unfettered
rational inquiry and, above all, scholarly reflection.47 Milton's Areopagitica
was in fact most directed towards academic writings.4' This is not intended
to suggest that the speech or publication protected by the First Amendment
should, on the basis of their historical antecedents, be confined to prose tracts
or arguments on the subject of politics. Obviously, literary and other artistic
works can and, through the centuries, have inspired thought and political
change.49 The free flow of information, including scientific knowledge, also
emerges as a natural part of public discourse. The principle protects any
written or verbal utterance that has the nature of or contributes to rational
discussion. That fairly encompassing proposition, however, still implies the
exclusion of certain sayings, writings, and demonstrative acts.
In Madison's very Lockean formulation, "a man has a property in his
opinions and the free communication of them."5 Furthermore, "[h]e has a
property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the profession and
practice dictated by them."'" Madison identifies a property right in
opinions, whether general or religious. Every verbal or written utterance,
however, does not convey an opinion. Certainly every action does not,
although lately, it seems that almost any deed or graphic display, short of
robbery and murder, has such communicative intent as to command First
Amendment protection. Madison's analysis may differ from those of his
Enlightenment predecessors, but he plainly understands "speech" (apart from
expressions of religious conviction) to be characterized by opinion or
45. E.g., CANAVAN, supra note 44, at 41-79, 143-52.
46. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 83-123 (H.B. Acton ed., J.M. Dent & Sons 1984).
47. MILTON, Areopagitica, in THE PORTABLE MILTON 151-205 (Douglas Bush ed., Penguin
Books 1977).
48. See CANAVAN, supra note 44, at 47; see also PANGLE, supra note 11, at 125-39, 158
(illuminating the connection between Milton's essay and its classical antecedents and the
applicability of his and related ancient writings to our present intellectual life).
49. See CANAVAN, supra note 44, at 36.
50. James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETrE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 266, 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
51. Id.; see also McGinnis, supra note 3, at 1758-73.
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argument, rational at least in form, and against which counterargument is
possible. 2 Like them he leaves us with the problem of defining the type of
speech to which the Amendment applies. 3
Our First Amendment jurisprudence did for some time recognize that the
Amendment does not protect "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting, or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 4 This
article of law certainly has been qualified, if not supplanted, by the succes-
sion of decisions since Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, in which the preceding
language first appeared. One innovation in the vocabulary of First Amend-
ment adjudication that slightly antedates Chaplinsky, is the term "freedom of
expression." This term may as well have replaced "freedom of speech" in
the constitutional text, so often does it appear. 5 Many actions and displays
52. See THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM 95 (1988) (analyzing
Madison's intent in this passage as "to promote a spirited and admiring involvement in public
life").
53. Partly relying upon Madison's article, McGinnis argues that rational discourse or
"disinterested deliberation" in the Framers' understandingwas not the basis for good government
or free speech. McGinnis, supra note 3, at 1760-61, 1770-71. Rather, he points out that the
Framers, while admiring "deliberation," believed that free speech was a property right, natural
and absolute, regardless of the rationality of public debate. McGinnis, of course, is responding
to recent attacks on freedom of speech by liberals who claim that this freedom is no longer
performing its assigned function of assuring such deliberation. As McGinnis says, the origin and
basis of the American system of government was a theory of natural right. This is the meaning
of Jefferson's reference to "self-evident" truths near the beginning of the Declaration of
Independence. Moreover, the Founders "treat love of liberty itself as an end and even as a kind
of virtue." PANGLE, supra note 52, at 94-95. The inalienable rights to "life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness" indeed may include the liberty to express one's opinions freely. This is not
to say, however, that the article of positive law known as the First Amendment, itself subject to
judicial interpretation and amendment by legal procedure, constitutes something other than a
means to effectuate the natural right. It is, furthermore, not to deny the Framers' hope that
rational and disinterested deliberation would attend free speech, although they did indeed
incorporate a variety of legal mechanisms to control the passions. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST,
No. 49, at 351 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1974) ("But it is the reason,
alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to
be controlled and regulated by the government."); see also PANGLE, supra note 52, at 94-96.
In other words, while it is true, as intimated by McGinnis, that the Framers did not rely upon
"disinterested deliberation" alone to preserve freedom, they certainly preserved free speech, in
part, to facilitate such deliberation. It is unnecessary to dispute this point in order to refute those
who want to curtail free speech the moment they dislike the outcome of public debate. Rational
deliberation is not their objective, but rather the unchallenged onrush of their egalitarianism.
54. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see BERNS, supra note 44,
a4, at 188-228.
55. See CANAVAN, supra note 44, at xii, 153. Canavan's research suggests the term
"freedom of expression" first appeared in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262, 265 (1941).
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of feeling that could not plausibly be called "speech" may nonetheless find
First Amendment protection as "expression."
Despite the foregoing tendency, there remains in our jurisprudence a
vestige of the notion acknowledged both in the Loper opinion and in the
scholarly writings defending its doctrine, namely, the notion that some
definable articulate message must be discernable in First Amendment
protected speech. This brings us to the central question suggested by the
Loper opinion. Does begging, whether in the subway or on the street,
constitute the sort of "speech" or "expression" that the First Amendment is
supposed to protect?
B. Panhandling as Protected Speech: The Communication of "Need"
One need not look far to find an emphatically affirmative answer to the
above question. The virtually unanimous legal academic community 6 now
joins an increasingly sympathetic judiciary, with the Young panel constituting
a rare exception.57 Does this portend the ultimate adjudication of such a
right by the Supreme Court?
That present First Amendment interpretation should differ from the
earliest modem theory of free speech or from that of a few decades ago is
perhaps not surprising. The law evolves, and the current generation of legal
scholars and jurists will no doubt choose to have progressed from previous,
less imaginative conceptions of free speech. Since, however, the Loper panel
proceeded from the premise that protected speech must convey an intelligible
message or idea,5" it should be possible to analyze similarly the issue of
panhandling.
The academic defenders of the constitutional right to beg, like the judges,
feel compelled to find an articulate message in the mere solicitation of
handouts on the streets. Their attempts to do so are sometimes a little
56. See sources cited supra note 4. But see Teir, supra note 11 (advocating minimum
standards of public conduct).
57. E.g., Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd in part, dismissed
in part, renmanded, 38 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994); People v. Pitts, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 1994, at
26 (Westbury Mun. Ct. Aug. 11, 1994). In People v. Schrader, 617 N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 1994), the court upheld the restriction of begging in the subway, affirmed that begging was
protected speech, and criticized the Young opinion's contrary sentiments. In City of Seattle v.
Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 908 (1991), the court
upheld an ordinance prohibiting the blockage of vehicular traffic. It ruled that the ordinance did
not prevent individuals from loitering along public thoroughfares as long as they did not
intentionally obstruct them. See also Roulette v. City of Seattle, 78 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1996)
(upholding ordinance against sleeping or sitting on sidewalks during the daytime); Streetwatch
v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (enjoining defendant
from ejecting homeless persons from Penn Station).
58. See Millich, supra note 4, at 259-61.
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startling. It is one thing to feel sympathy for destitute persons. It is quite
another to pretend that their every sound and movement conveys deep
meaning. In all honesty, it may not have occurred to some of us that a lady
holding a white paper cup and standing in front of a grocery store while
chanting "Spare some change? Have a nice day" engages in "speech that
adds to both societal and individual enlightenment" and that "provides
information about poverty and the lives of poor people." 9 Still less did we
appreciate that "her words are a page of current events 'worth a volume of
logic.""'6  While it is true that some panhandlers have more to say than
"Spare some change?" this turns out to be immaterial. For "even if the
beggar conveys nothing more than that she wants the listener to give her
money, this information contributes to the collective search for truth."'" In
fact, "views about the way in which society should be ordered are implicit in
the beggar's request for money." This is so because the beggar's "plea is a
direct challenge to prevailing assumptions about the social responsibilities
that members of a community owe to each other."'62 The mere presence of
the panhandler standing before us with hand outstretched is a symbolic
enactment. It becomes something in the order of a Kabuki play, with that
refreshing spontaneity that prior arrangement and rehearsal would imperil,
directing the mind to the current social condition and so enjoying constitu-
tional protection.63
It is true that panhandlers sometimes attempt to persuade, or even cajole,
their prospective benefactors. This, however, may not entirely justify the
statement that "[t]he context of begging often constitutes an actual dialogue
between beggar and donor in which the beggar often pleads the cause of the
homeless and destitute."'  The underlying premise again is that any
utterance, encounter, or sight that directs the human mind to some social
problem enjoys the protection of the First Anendment. If a dilapidated man
holds out his hand or makes such a declaration as "I'm hungry! Can you
help me?" and makes us think of poverty in America, then his presence,
action, and utterances are all protected speech. They are as much so as an
address by the Mayor of the City of New York on the subject, or as Victor
Hugo's tale of Jean Valjean.65
59. Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 4, at 898.




63. Chevigny, supra note 4, at 543-44; People v. Pitts, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 1994, at 26
("People are enlightened when they see a beggar such as defendant Pitts. Their enlightenment
is caused by their realization that the poor are real people who have real problems, who live in
their neighborhood.").
64. Knapp, supra note 4, at 414.
65. VICrOR HuGo, LEs MISERABLES (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1984) (1887). The example of
19971]
13
Nichols: The Panhandler's First Amendment Right: A Critique of Loper v. Ne
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
Can we really determine the applicability of the First Amendment on the
basis of what impressions, rational or otherwise, an act or circumstance may
trigger, regardless of whether the actor or creator of the circumstance exhibits
any intention of speaking? The human mind is agile and reactive. Virtually
any sight or sound-the birds chirping in the trees" or the sound of running
water-can propel the mind through a series of thoughts, however related.
If the sight of a destitute adult and her request for a handout constitute
protected speech because they remind us of something else that could be the
subject of rational discourse, then would the tears or appearance of her child
(for beggars are sometimes known to appear with same) also constitute
protected speech?
Are there not also conversations between robbers and kidnappers and
their victims? Might such a conversation, or the act of robbery itself, not
direct the victim's attention to the problem of crime in America? If the
request for spare change is brought within the ambit of the First Amendment
simply by virtue of the fact that such words are evocative of the problem of
poverty, then why exactly are the words "Give me some change or I'll blow
your head off," uttered in the same location (forum) at the same time not
protected? Is it because of the obvious countervailing societal interest in
preventing robbery? But under Texas v. Johnson, it is only when an
utterance meets the threshold condition of being speech within the First
Amendment that a court may consider whether the circumstances and
logistics of the speech make it nonetheless subject to prohibition.67 Is this
unmistakably criminal utterance within the category of protected speech
(because it might make us think of the problem of poverty) and subject to
suppression only because it carries some other undesirable consequence? Is
Les Miserables indeed is invoked in Millich, supra note 4, at 265 n.20, to suggest that our
society presents the same choices to its impoverished as did 19th Century France. Many societies
have maintained laws against begging. See Teir, supra note 11, at 292-300. But ours does
provide a few alternatives by which the life of a destitute person may be preserved and improved.
See sources cited supra note 16.
66. The purpose of this analogy is not to denigrate the humanity of beggars, but only to
demonstrate the implications of making "protected speech" of any sensory stimulus. "Speech"
is a human attribute, not because animals are incapable of making sounds that convey pleasure
or pain, but because only human beings can convey opinions of the good and the bad, the just
and the unjust. As it once was put:
[M]an alone among the animals has speech. The voice indeed indicates the painful
or pleasant, and hence is present in other animals as well; for their nature has come
this far, that they have a perception of the painful and the pleasant and indicate these
things to each other. But speech serves to reveal the advantageous and the harmful,
and hence also the just and the unjust.
ARISTOTLE, POLmcs 37 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1984).
67. 491 U.S. at 403. See also International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
505 U.S. 679 (1992) (stating that prohibiting the solicitation of religious contributions in a
nonpublic forum is reasonable despite its First Amendment speech protection).
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not the prospect of streets and subways populated by beggars also undesir-
able, even if less serious than robbery?
In Loper, the court found that the police could easily restrain the anti-
social aspects of begging by enforcement of the Penal Law sections against
harassment, disorderly conduct, menacing, and fraudulent accosting. It was
"ludicrous" to suggest otherwise. 8 But does it make sense to say that
panhandling constitutes protected speech, conveying an important message,
and, at the same time, that these misdemeanor statutes may apply to it? If
the beggar's request for money is protected speech under the First Amend-
ment because it forces the listener to think about poverty, then why should
the accuracy of the beggar's claims about himself be relevant? Thus far,
commercial speech is the only variety to lose its First Amendment protection
on the ground of factual inaccuracy. 9 The theory that panhandling is a form
of commercial speech and, therefore, merits protection under the First
Amendment will receive attention in due course, but for the moment, we may
note that the New York fraudulent accosting statute is not directed at
commercial speech in any previously acknowledged sense.7" Rather, it
addresses confidence games designed to separate the unwary from their
money. No one contends that such machinations convey an important social
message. If begging does convey one, it is difficult to fathom how it could
lose its First Amendment protection on the basis of inaccurate representations
about the financial condition of the speaker. Such a penal law section has
applicability only because the act of begging, per se, has no declarative,
informative, or disquisitional content, but is merely a request or a demand for
money. And it is impossible to demonstrate that any utterance is protected
speech under the First Amendment because, whatever its nature, it may make
us think of something else that could be the subject of genuine protected
speech.
68. Loper, 999 F.2d at 701-02.
69. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1993); Peel v. Attorney Disciplinary
Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,
638 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 199-200 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
70. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.30 (McKinney 1988) provides:
1. A person is guilty of fraudulent accosting when he accosts a person in a
public place with intent to defraud him of money or property by means of a trick,
swindle or confidence game.
2. A person who, either at the time he accosts another in a public place or at
some subsequent time or at some other place, makes statements to him or engages in
conduct with respect to him of a kind commonly made or performed in the
perpetration of a known type of confidence game, is presumed to intend to defraud
such person of money or other property.
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There are certainly efforts to deny that First Amendment protected
speech need concern itself with the transmission of ideas at all." This
argument, in the first place, would appear to be based upon the misinterpreta-
tion of a 1948 Supreme Court opinion, Winters v. New York,7" overturning
the conviction of a book dealer for selling a crime magazine. The statute in
that case, criminalizing, among other things, the publication of all "accounts
of criminal deeds," was broad enough to outlaw Dostoyevsky novels. In
holding that the free press prohibition did not apply only to the "exposition"
of ideas, the Court was merely stating that the ideas could be conveyed in a
fictional or poetic form, as well as in a prose treatise.73 The Winters Court
saw "nothing of any possible value to society" in the magazines at issue.7"
The same judgment could be applied to any wholly foolish editorial or
campaign speech, or to any artistic work that ineptly attempted to convey a
silly view of things. The Court, moreover, indicated a sentence later that the
publications in question would be subject to suppression if they were "lewd,
indecent, obscene or profane."75 Thus, even Winters is consistent with the
premise that whatever its merit, protected speech must have theform of either
deliberative, informative, or narrative (including fictional) discourse.
The analysis of any First Amendment question is facilitated by first
examining in isolation that which is alleged to be speech. 6 The threshold
question must be whether some speech in the sense contemplated by the First
Amendment is involved. Then, assuming it is, the question becomes whether
the circumstances in which it occurs (time, place and manner) can be
regulated for any identifiable public reason. The second part of this analysis,
according to Johnson, requires that the court decide whether the regulation
of what has been adjudged speech is "related to the suppression of free
expression." Thus, in the case of expressive conduct, the question is
whether the challenged regulation is directed at the expression itself or
merely at its time, place and manner. The more lenient O'Brien standard is
applied if the regulation is not directed at the expression." In the instance
71. E.g., Donner, supra note 4, at 160-61. In this sense, the liberal commentators make
common cause with those conservative ones who deny that the justification for freedom of speech
is at all related to rational deliberation. See supra note 53.
72. 333 U.S. 507, 508-11 (1948).
73. Id. at 510.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1989) (holding that burning of the
flag constituted expressive conduct which is protected by the First Amendment); International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992). See also Teir, supra
note 11, at 321-24.
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of flag-burning, the Johnson Court found that the regulation was related to
expression and that no "compelling state interest" justified its prohibition.
But to repeat, the first question is whether protected speech is involved,
which under our present law can include expressive conduct.
79
The Court in Texas v. Johnson made the primary test whether there was
an attempt to convey a "particularized message" likely to be understood by
the listeners. This requires asking if the allegedly protected utterance is by
its nature subject to rational discourse, response, or meditation. If the
utterance is a shout of "fire" in a crowded theater, for example, it would
appear to admit of no discourse or argument, at least at the time it is made.
Such speech is but a representation regarding factual circumstances of which
the speaker claims to have unique knowledge. If it is true, it cannot
immediately be considered or argued about by the listeners, except at peril
of their lives. There is nothing for them to do except act upon the purported
observation. ° Thus, we might say that the words are not protected speech,
since the purpose of rational discourse is not served by insulating them from
criminal prohibition. If it should then appear that there is some public reason
for regulating and indeed punishing such speech, such as preventing the loss
of life by a stampede to the doors of a crowded theater, the state or locality
may do so."
79. This seems distorted in Rose, supra note 4, at 202. There, something called "public
forum protection" is advanced as though it were immaterial what the alleged expression was.
The author concedes that begging does not contain the elements of protected speech established
for symbolic activity in Johnson: "As an independent First Amendment argument, the beggar's
implicit expression fails to contain ... these elements." Id. at 206. He goes on to assert:
"When advanced in support of the claim to public forum protection, however, the beggar's
implicit expression remains a forceful and compelling consideration." Id. No one doubts that the
public streets have been a traditional forum for speech (a fact emphasized in Loper, 999 F.2d at
703), and that the regulation of "speech" there is subject to "the highest scrutiny." But it is first
necessary to ascertain that "speech" is involved. The Amendment protects speech and speakers,
not the infrastructure.
80. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 12.8, at 605 (1978).
81. This is not, to be sure, the analysis offered by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). There the Court merely asserts that "the character of every act
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done," and that speech may be criminalized when
"the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent." Id. at 52. This maxim, which is no longer the law, see infra note 82, is broad enough
to allow the prohibition of virtually any speech that at a particular time may have a bad effect.
The leaflets involved in Schenck contained statements that the draft was unconstitutional and
immoral, and exhorted the readers to assert their opposition. Id. at 51. Even assuming that this
might constitute incitement of a specific act of draft evasion, there is no doubt that abstract
advocacy, if effective, can generate a clear and present danger of many substantive evils. And
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A similar analysis can be applied to any of the inchoate crimes that
involve speech: solicitation, incitement, and conspiracy. It has long been
established in the law respecting these crimes82 that to utter any revolution-
ary doctrine as an abstract proposition is one matter; certainly such utterance
admits of rational discourse and refutation. To incite a crowd to commit a
specific violent act is altogether different. Such language of incitement is
closer to voicing a command which does not have the character of an opinion
expressed for discussion and thought. To solicit, in speech, a criminal act
from an individual by asking that person to commit the act does not involve
the First Amendment. In the same way, the actual request that a passer-by
immediately hand over funds, though not heinous in the same manner as a
criminal incitement or solicitation, is distinguishable from the abstract
advocacy of a cause. It is true that any charitable solicitation also includes
a request for funds. There is a certain difficulty in classifying any pure
solicitation as protected speech under this analysis. But as discussed
below, 3 the Supreme Court's rationale for deeming charitable solicitation
protected speech is that it characteristically is accompanied by advocacy of
a public cause.
A panhandler, by definition, does not solicit for the cause of the
homeless. He is soliciting for one of their number-himself (assuming he
really is homeless). Indeed, he cannot "earn his living" by merely arguing
general propositions or charitable causes to passersby. That does not imply
a constitutional right to beg. The First Amendment does not have as its
precise purpose the assurance of pecuniary reward. It is true that commercial
advertising now enjoys the status of protected speech. The rationale for this
innovation, however, was that a purely economic interest on the part of a
speaker or writer should not preclude First Amendment protection if his
speech contains information of general interest." A mercenary objective
does not disqualify the speech from constitutional status. Nonetheless, the
attainment of that objective is not the sine qua non of First Amendment
protection. It is a constitutional liberty, not a means of making a living."
82. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); cf. Dennis vs. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 581-91 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
83. See infra pp. 285-88.
84. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976).
85. Cf. Michael Kinsley,Abortion-rightsDenand Can SourHealth Reform, N.Y. PosT, May
31, 1994, at 19. Suggesting that abortion advocates refrain from demanding public financing,
Kinsley observes: "Freedom of speech doesn't get you a megaphone. Freedom of religion
doesn't buy you transportation to church. These are rights against government interference, not
rights to a government-financed supply of the good in question." Id. While this is not quite the
same issue, the relevant point is that the preservation and exercise of a constitutional right need
not imply pecuniary gain or subsidy. It helps us to reject the proposition that the panhandler's
expression is not free unless he makes money from it. Just as the First Amendment is not the
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The Loper court apparently finds the New York statute violative of the
First Amendment because "begging implicates expressive conduct or
communicative activity."86  This is perfectly reasonable insofar as any
"expression" or "communication" or deed that may inspire the listener to
conceive a "particularized social or political message" constitutes protected
speech. If, however, the object of the First Amendment, as reflected in its
historical antecedents, is to preserve political opinion and rational discourse
(or opinion and rational discourse generally) in order to foster a speech that
is disquisitional in nature and admits of reflection, disputation and response,
then the classification of a panhandler's request for money as protected
speech appears less than reasonable. Further, while we would expect the
First Amendment to protect anyone's right to advocate the cause of the
homeless, or generosity towards them, or any public policy that addresses the
problem, a simple request for funds made by their intended recipient and
directed at someone walking upon the streets itself appears to have no
argumentative or rational content. The utterance is in the form of a mild (or
not so mild) imperative, or a request for a favor, not a declarative statement
with which one can agree or disagree. For this reason, it makes absolutely no
sense to debate whether the New York anti-loitering statute is "content-
neutral." The standard of content-neutrality is satisfied as long as the basis
upon which the government regulates speech is not "disagreement with the
message [the speech] conveys.""7 It is not possible to agree or disagree with
a request for money, it is possible only to grant or refuse it. Panhandling per
se has no articulate intellectual content, nor does it constitute news or
information upon which one could formulate an argument or point of view.
C. The Charitable Solicitation Theory
Perhaps the most compelling argument offered by the Loper court and
its defenders in the academic community is the analogy to charitable
solicitation. In Young, the court dealt at length with an issue that the Loper
panel also finds important; soliciting for charities in such public places as
right to a "government-financed supply" of anything, so it is not an assurance of material reward
from the speech it protects.
86. Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
87. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989); accord Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984) (stating that a prohibition is content-neutral
if it is "not being applied because of disagreementwith the message presented"). Mr. Teir seems
somewhat taken in by the argument that ordinances preventing begging, but allowing other face-
to-face discourse on the street initiated by strangers, are thereby not content-neutral. Teir, supra
note 11, at 325-26. Actually, many forms of unsolicited discourse are illegal on the public
streets. Robbery, drug-selling, and prostitution are the first few examples that come to mind.
Someone has to express an opinion before "content-neutrality" becomes an issue.
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subways. The Loper court relied upon the airport solicitation case of
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc v. Lee.,8 while in
Young, three other decisions: Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment;89 Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.;' and Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind, Inc.,91 were the focus of attention. The Young
court's distinction between solicitation by public charities and by panhandlers
rests on two grounds. First, the Transit Authority indicated that regulating
organized charitable solicitors in the subways was less problematic than
controlling individual beggars. A second basis of distinction related to the
status of panhandling and charitable solicitation as protected speech.
In Young the court observed that the difference between charitable
solicitation and begging "must be examined not from the imaginary heights
of Mount Olympus."'  Accordingly, "[w]hile organized charities serve
community interests by enhancing communication and disseminating ideas,
the conduct of begging and panhandling in the subway amounts to nothing
less than a menace to the common good."'93 The court also quoted Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Schaumburg, stating: "'[N]othing in the United
States Constitution should prevent residents of a community from making the
collective judgment that certain worthy charities may solicit ... while at the
same time insulating themselves against panhandlers, profiteers, and ped-
dlers." 94
To the Loper panel and to the academic defenders of a First Amendment
right to beg, no distinction exists between solicitation for a charitable or
political organization and solicitation by beggars on a street corner. A beggar
simply solicits for his favorite charity-himself. One commentator supports
this insight with the following argument: (1) pursuant to the charitable
solicitation cases, speakers' interests in making money do not vitiate their
otherwise valid First Amendment rights; (2) to entertain such a distinction is
to discriminate on the "basis of the speech's source"; (3) such a distinction
leads "to the anomalous result that two homeless people could solicit
donations for each other but a solitary homeless person could not solicit
contributions for herself'; (4) the only difference between professional
88. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
89. 444 U.S. 620 (1980); see also Church of Soldiers of Cross of Christ v. Riverside, 886
F. Supp. 721, 726 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance against "aggressive
solicitation" by a church and distinguishing this "charitable solicitation" by religious and political
groups from begging).
90. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
91. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
92. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 156 (2d Cir. 1990).
93. Id.
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solicitors and beggars is that perhaps the former's "message is clearer," and
First Amendment protection should not be limited to the "articulate"; (5)
both charitable solicitors and beggars seek contributions for the benefit of
"society's less fortunate members," with the donation showing support for
"the recipient and her views"; (6) beggars, like charitable solicitors, are
dependent for their living upon the solicitation of funds; and (7) if beggars
were prevented from soliciting donations, "they would engage in fewer
conversations with passersby," and therefore protected speech would be
chilled.9" It is necessary to respond point-by-point.
First, the decisions in Schaumburg and its progeny held that utterances
involving "a variety of speech interests-communication of information, the
dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of
causes--" are not excluded from First Amendment protection simply because
they are also intended to elicit funds.96 Noting specifically that charitable
solicitation "characteristically [is] intertwined with informative and perhaps
persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views
on economic, political, or social issues," the Schaumberg Court held that
"[c]anvassers in such contexts are necessarily more than solicitors for
money."97 Furthermore, the Court stated that "charitable solicitation does
more than inform private economic decisions."" In contrast, panhandlers
are typically concerned only with eliciting private economic decisions from
their intended benefactors. They want their donors to reach into their
pockets, take out sums of money, and hand them over for the panhandlers'
personal and immediate use. A panhandler's conduct generally is not aimed
at alleviating the problem of global homelessness.
Second, the distinction between charitable solicitation and panhandling
has nothing to do with the "source" of the utterance at issue. Although most
organized charities would presumably avoid having the average panhandler
as their representative, the same individual who stands on the street and begs
could be the representative of a charitable solicitor. The distinction between
the panhandler and the charitable solicitor has to do with the nature and
purpose of their expression, not with who they are.
Third, a qualitative First Amendment difference exists because the
beggar is only concerned with obtaining a handout for himself, and not with
advocating any cause. This would not change because one panhandler
includes another in his request for funds. We remain in the realm of requests
95. Millich, supra note 4, at 284-86; see also Knapp, supra note 4, at 416-18 (enumerating
many of the same arguments).
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for charity to specific beneficiaries, on the basis of their physical presence,
not the advocacy of any public issue.
Fourth, no one is suggesting thaf advocacy must be eloquent to be
protected by the First Amendment. A beggar has an absolute First Amend-
ment right to advocate, in an articulate or inarticulate fashion, any idea,
notion, premise, belief or social cause he chooses. A mere request for a
handout, even if made by Patrick Henry, would not constitute advocacy of
anything. There are no views expressed in the act of street begging per se
for the contributor to endorse.
Finally, begging should not be constitutionally protected because it is
how panhandlers make their living. Prostitutes make their living by
prostitution and confidence men by confidence scams. If we wish to have a
civilized, decent society where life is peaceful and productive for those
disposed to be so, it behooves us to "chill" the speech of derelicts loitering
upon the public streets and bothering passersby. That is rather the idea. This
is not to exclude any other means of helping the homeless to address, in
particular, the substance abuse and mental health problems that frequently
account for their condition. The public acts and programs best suited to treat
these problems, and the efforts to restore the destitute to independent and
fruitful lives, are, however, another issue.
D. The Commercial Speech Argument
The argument that begging is "commercial speech" also has support.99
It attracts limited enthusiasm, implying slightly lower level of First Amend-
ment scrutiny (that is to say protection) than the "charitable solicitation"
theory." To suggest that a panhandler holding up his cup and eliciting
funds from a passerby is engaged in a commercial transaction requires the
intimation that "[t]he generous donor purchases the satisfaction and peace of
mind that comes from helping another human being.''. We might ask
whether giving a birthday cake to a five-year-old child is also a commercial
transaction, or whether the theory would affect the imposition of gift taxes
under the Internal Revenue Code.
When the Supreme Court extended the protection of the First Amend-
ment to commercial speech, it found that the information disseminated in
advertising is of value to the consumer and extends to such matters of public
policy as abortion rights, environmentalism, and the balance of trade."°
99. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
100. See Rose, supra note 4, at 215-17.
101. Miclieh, supra note 4, at 295.
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Such a rationale surely has no applicability to panhandling. The pan-
handler's benefactor is not a consumer deciding from which supplicant he can
purchase the best "satisfaction and peace of mind." And once again, to
suggest that street begging constitutes discourse on political affairs is to
affront common sense.
IV. THE ABSENCE OF ALTERNATIVE FORUMS: THE AVAILABILITY OF
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT
The conclusion that panhandling lacks the communicative content
necessary to qualify as protected speech would render unnecessary an inquiry
into the purpose of its regulation or the alternative means available. Since,
however, the Loper court makes and repeats the assertion that beggars, if
prevented from plying their "trade," have no other means of making their
comment upon poverty in America, a brief reply is required. No one stops
beggars from standing on soapboxes and inveighing against the world's ills
from sunup until sundown to all who care to listen. No one inhibits them
from marching in a demonstration with placards or from distributing leaflets,
as they now, in New York City, display their newspaper, Street News."°3 In
fact, the law denies panhandlers only the liberty to hustle money on the
public street, not the right to practice advocacy in general. The statute
declared unconstitutional in Loper made loitering for the purpose of begging
a violation-not technically a crime. Its principal significance was not that
of authorizing arrests and prosecutions, but of allowing the police to disperse
panhandlers and to make them "move on."'O' If there is a less restrictive
way to preserve civility on the public streets, then the Loper panel and its
academic defenders have not defined it.
The Loper court does not seem particularly interested in the practical
problems of controlling aggressive panhandling through the enforcement of
statutes against harassment, menacing and fraudulent accosting. To bring
cases under such theories requires the complaint and cooperation of a victim.
Establishing the elements of fraudulent accosting,' in particular, demands
a modicum of criminal investigation, not easily contributed into by an
overburdened police force at such a low level of offense. Although a federal
appeals court, not used to dealing with petty crimes, may find it "ludicrous"
to suggest that there are practical problems in controlling street begging
through misdemeanor statutes, anyone experienced in state law enforcement
103. See Teir, supra note 11, at 327.
104. See Kelling, supra note 11, at 19.
105. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.30 (McKinney 1988). The reader, unlike the federal court,
may wish to consider the difficulty of applying such a statute to begging, after the courts
determine that the act per se is constitutionally protected.
1997]
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will know better. Having declared panhandling itself to be a protected
liberty, we are asking the police to determine when it is done in an overly
aggressive or obstreperous manner"° or on the basis of provably false
representations. We are asking them to intervene in the hope that the
inevitable counter-charges of unconstitutional arrest are not ratified by the
courts. In this day and age, police officers understandably may be a little
wary of becoming defendants in civil actions and criminal prosecutions.
They may fear the consequences of discerning poorly the distinction between
constitutionally protected and unprotected panhandling.
V. CONCLUSION
This discussion has concerned a certain interpretation of the First
Amendment and has attempted to demonstrate that it is a misinterpretation.
In Loper, the court adopts a standard for extending the Amendment's
protection: whether the alleged speech contains a "particularized social or
political message."' 0 7 The application of this criterion to panhandling does
not justify the court's conclusion. The finding that beggars engage in
political discourse when they stop people on the streets and ask them for
money runs against ordinary experience and strains credulity. The mind may
indeed turn to the subject of poverty, because of an encounter with a
panhandler. It may even turn to the topics of civic disorder and criminality.
All of the observable phenomena of the world, however, do not enjoy First
Amendment protection, even if they can each inspire a train of thought. The
mere request for a handout is not a comment upon anything.
The elaboration of the Loper doctrine in scholarly journals carries it to
notable extremes. The sight of a panhandler, precisely because it is
unpleasant, represents indispensable enlightenment. Those whom the beggar
accosts need to be reminded of his plight. If they object, that reflects their
insensitivity to the tragedy of homelessness, and to its injustice. They want
106. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney Supp. 1996) provides, in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent to
harass, annoy or alarm another person:
2. He or she follows a person in or about a public place or places; or
3. He or she engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which
alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose.
See also Charles Mitchell, Note, Aggressive Panhandling Legislation and Free Speech Claims:
Begging for Trouble, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rv. 697, 713-14 (1994) (opposing ordinances against
panhandlingyet acknowledgingthe difficulty of using harassment statutes to control it). In 1996,
the New York City Council and Mayor Guilliani did enact Local Law No. 80, "against certain
forms of aggressive solicitation." City of New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 80 (Sept. 26, 1996).
The law, among other things, prohibits begging within ten feet of automated teller machines.
107. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 48:267
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to "sweep it under the rug." In the apprehension of certain commentators,
those resenting the presence of panhandlers are the ones deserving society's
opprobrium. These arguments are implausible, to say the least and antisocial
in their tendency. We need hardly abandon our public spaces to the destitute
and dysfunctional to be aware that they exist. The way out of their
predicament surely is by not erecting a legal shield around their present habits
and inflicting a punishment on the rest of society. The further contention,
that ordinances against panhandling discriminate against the speech of the
"poor," actually insults all those persons of limited means who do not resort
to begging. It implies that their speech consists solely of requests for charity.
The argument that begging is not different in principle from charitable
solicitation is of some limited interest. The act of solicitation, per se, is not
disquisitional, argumentative or informative, whomever is to receive the funds
solicited. Charitable solicitation, nonetheless, typically accompanies
advocacy on behalf of the solicitor's cause. That cause is more general than
that of his own pocketbook. That is the distinction that the Supreme Court's
charitable solicitation decisions suggest.
Conjecture upon the fate of the Loper doctrine in other circuits or before
the Court is, of course, difficult. The status of the "particularized message"
standard after Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Lesbian and Bisexual Group°8
is perhaps one piece of the puzzle. Whatever the scope of First Amendment
protection, the judiciary must maintain a discerning notion of that which
actually constitutes the propagation of viewpoints and information. It should
adopt a notion affirming common sense, or at least not affronting it. Above
all, it should not use constitutional theory to gratify an egalitarian dogma,
hampering the efforts of elected municipal officials to improve life in their
cities. The solution to the problem of homelessness will not be found in the
Constitution. The Constitution is there to organize a "system of ordered
liberties," in which citizens may be confident that law-abiding endeavor will
bring respect, prosperity, and a measure of tranquility.
108. 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995); see supra note 36.
1997]
25
Nichols: The Panhandler's First Amendment Right: A Critique of Loper v. Ne
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
26
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss2/3
